DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS
Application for the Correction of
the Coast Guard Record of:
BCMR Docket No. 2007-124
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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FINAL DECISION
This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 and section 425 of
title 14 of the United States Code. The Chair docketed the case on April 13, 2007, upon receipt
of the completed application, and assigned it to staff member J. Andrews to prepare the decision
for the Board as required by 33 C.F.R. § 52.61(c).
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case.
This final decision, dated January 24, 2008, is approved and signed by the three duly
APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS
The applicant asked the Board to raise his performance mark for “Professional Compe-
tence” on his officer evaluation report (OER) for the period June 1, 2003, to June 7, 2004, from a
mark of 3 to a mark of 4 or 5.1 The applicant alleged that his test scores and flight evaluations
show that he met the written standard for a mark of 4 or higher on the OER form. Block 3.e. of
the disputed OER appears as follows:
Professional
Competence
Ability to acquire,
apply, and share
technical and
administrative
knowledge and
skills associated
with description of
duties. (Includes
operational aspects
such as marine
safety, seaman-
ship, airmanship,
SAR, etc., as
appropriate.)
Superior expertise; advice
and actions showed great
breadth and depth of knowl-
edge. Remarkable grasp of
complex issues, concepts,
and situations. Rapidly
developed professional
growth beyond expectations.
Vigorously conveyed knowl-
edge, directly resulting in
increased workplace produc-
tivity. Insightful knowledge of
own role, customer needs,
and value of work.
○
Competent and credible
authority on specialty or
operational issues. Acquired
and applied excellent
operational or specialty
expertise for assigned
duties. Showed profession-
al growth through education,
training and professional
reading. Shared knowledge
and information with others
clearly and simply. Under-
stood own organizational
role and customer needs.
Questionable competence
and credibility. Operational
or specialty expertise
inadequate or lacking in key
areas. Made little effort to
grow professionally. Used
knowledge as power against
others or bluffed rather than
acknowledging ignorance.
Effectiveness reduced due
to limited knowledge of own
organizational role and
customer needs.
3
●
5
○
○
○
1
○
1 Coast Guard officers are rated in numerous categories of performance on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being best. A
middle mark of 4 is the “expected standard of performance.” Personnel Manual, Art. 10.A.4.c.4.g.
7
○
The following written comment in the OER supports the mark of 3: “Displayed lack of
motivation & leadership to upgrade to Aircraft Cdr, well beyond the normally expected timeline
of peers; aviation status terminated, reassigned to duties not involving flight ops.”
The applicant stated that he was designated as an HH-60 First Pilot on December 4, 2002,
and that the “normal progression from HH-60 First Pilot to Aircraft Commander is 18 months.”
By May 20, 2003, he alleged, less than six months after he became a First Pilot, he had submitted
a request form to be upgraded to Aircraft Commander and had “started working to complete
other prerequisites.” He argued that because he submitted the request form and started working
to complete the prerequisites less than six months after becoming a First Pilot, the comment in
the OER that he “[d]isplayed lack of motivation & leadership to upgrade to Aircraft Cdr, well
beyond the normally expected timeline of peers” is clearly erroneous and unfair. The applicant
further alleged his motivation during the reporting period is proved by the fact that in July 2003,
he completed the Aircraft Commander Upgrade Syllabus Open Book Exam; in September 2003,
he completed the air station’s Closed Book Exam; and in November 2003—less than a year after
becoming a First Pilot—he completed the National Search and Rescue Fundamental Course. In
support of his allegations, the applicant submitted the following documents:
• An undated copy of his Aircraft Commander Upgrade Syllabus Open Book Exam, which
indicates that he scored 92% correct.
• An “Annual NVG Check” dated August 13, 2003, in which the instructor wrote, “Excel-
lent flight by [the applicant]. Good knowledge of identifying simulated emergencies and
providing the correct bold-faced response. Very comfortable with the NVG environment.
Great job, flew all maneuvers and handled simulated emergencies at the AC level.”
• A critique of the applicant’s flying dated August 24, 2003, in which the instructor wrote
that during a flight to pick up and deliver a law enforcement team to a hijacked Cuban vessel,
the applicant “did a great job of VFR navigating across the state and used his ‘Army’ training
to point out all towers and hazards en route. … We discussed different options with the crew
as to our mission and [the applicant] provided good input and recommendations.”
• A second critique dated August 24, 2003, in which the instructor wrote that during a night
flight to Cortez with calm winds and calm seas, the applicant “[f]lew all maneuvers to stan-
dard on first attempt except the MATCH. … Recommended for the AC syllabus DN!”
• A third critique dated August 24, 2003, in which the instructor stated that during a night
flight to practice rescuing a swimmer, the applicant used “[g]ood visual cues for hoisting.
Well-prepped for brief, knew procedures well, and nice aircraft control during swimmer
evolutions. All hoists completed the first time to the level of an AC. Throughout flight, nice
acft control.”
• A fourth critique dated August 24, 2003, in which the instructor wrote that in a heavy
landing exercise, the applicant performed “[a]ll maneuvers … to the S level first time and
with excellent aircraft control. Discussed limits, EP and techniques for flying in heavy gross
weight conditions.”
• A copy of an “A/S Xxxxxxxx Closed Book Exam” dated September 16, 2003, shows that
he scored 98% correct.
• A critique of the applicant’s performance dated September 24, 2003, in which the instruc-
tor stated that the applicant showed “above average knowledge of the Tactical Navigation
system! Easily worked through the search and DF exercise. Nice Job.”
• A second critique dated September 24, 2003, in which the instructor wrote about an
“external load” carrying exercise, “Excellent flight. Used good judgment to go around when
he realized the approach was too steep and we risked getting into power settling.”
• A third critique dated September 24, 2003, in which the instructor wrote about a “rough
area/stops” exercise, “Nice job. Almost as if you have been in down these tactically before.”
• A fourth critique dated September 24, 2003, in which the instructor wrote about a “day
land” exercise, “An excellent pattern flight for [the applicant]. Great systems knowledge.
Excellent aircraft control and maneuver knowledge. Needs a little more practice on Autos.
AFCS off flight was above average.”
• A critique of the applicant’s performance dated October 2, 2003, in which the instructor
wrote that it was an “[e]xcellent flight overall. Most of maneuvers were to the “S” level.
[The applicant] has trouble with station keeping in calm winds in both DIW hoist and RS
ops. He tends to select reference points too far away from the aircraft. Try using foam about
50 feet at the 2 o’clock.”
• An evaluation of the applicant’s performance during his HH-60J Proficiency Course,
dated October 27, 2003, in which the instructor wrote that the applicant
arrived for his Pcourse motivated and ready to learn. All maneuvers were completed to the appro-
priate level, though with some difficulty. It was evidence that [he] spent some time preparing for
his Pcourse because he was well versed in all procedures. I was also impressed with how open and
receptive he was to input from both his instructor and stick buddy, and his effective use of CRM.
We had the opportunity to discuss and dissect many systems and how each EP affects its associ-
ated components. As far as stick and rudder skills, I noticed [he] had some difficulty with his
autos and matches. I realize these are very difficult to do in the simulator, but these were not the
normal problems we see with those maneuvers. After watching him extensively, I noticed he was
not using an effective instrument scan (i.e. – he wasn’t looking at the right instrument at the right
time). [He] was making corrections when he was off parameters, but was not catching the error in
a timely manner and over correcting. Knowing this, I gave [him] some scanning techniques and
we tried to nail these two maneuvers down on the last day. I am happy to say that he greased
almost all of his autos and shot some of the best matches that I have seen in the sim[ulator] to date
– nicely done! Before we started this week, I noticed [he] is still qualified as an FP [First Pilot] at
Airsta Xxxxxxxx. I kept this in mind over the entire week to use as a benchmark for consideration
to AC [Aircraft Commander]. All things considered, only after [he] gets a little more practice
doing some night matches and work developing a good instrument scan would I consider him for
the AC syllabus. I do, however, believe it can be done with some work. Great effort this week!
• A critique of the applicant’s performance dated November 3, 2003, in which the instruc-
tor wrote about a “night land” exercise, “Great Flight – Solid acft control with smooth control
inputs. Quizzed [the applicant] on EP’s, systems and limits throughout flight. His knowl-
edge level was up to par. No deficiencies noted in maneuvers execution or Dash-1 knowl-
edge. All maneuvers flown to the S level first attempt except the min speed approach.”
• A letter dated November 4, 2003, congratulating the applicant for having successfully a
correspondence course called Search and Rescue Fundamentals.
• A critique dated November 6, 2003, in which the instructor wrote that during an “airways
trainer” flight, the applicant
completed many items that were incomplete on previous IFR trainer with [LCDR M]. Preflight
briefing asserted that [the applicant] was “acting AC” and I would be “acting CP” to offer oppor-
tunity to demonstrate decision making capabilities. I only interjected when safety or deviation
from requirements was necessary. Most items completed to required level. However some lapses
occurred. Initial flight planning was completed to required levels with minor discrepancies (see
specific tasks). Enroute portion of flight was mostly uneventful (see comment on clearance).
Never completed ILS due to aircraft equipment malfunction (see specific comment on CRM).
Completed NDB at Zepherhills Airport (see specific comments on NDB). VFR return was com-
pleted to required levels.
• A critique of the applicant’s performance dated November 14, 2003, in which the instruc-
tor wrote about a “NVG EP Review” that the
[f]light began with an explicit brief that [the applicant] would act as the AC to demonstrate ability
to maintain situational awareness, provide leadership, and make sound decisions. During entry
into MacDill RWY 04 traffic pattern, tower required us to enter a mid-field downwind (stated
twice). [The applicant] elected to enter downwind at the base leg point. Tower requested “ident”
to confirm our position and advised of two aircraft on final. With T-38 traffic on short final and
second T-38 traffic on 8 nm final, [the applicant] began to turn base at approx 5-6 nm final. [I]
stated “turn right now” to return to downwind heading. Rest of approach was uneventful. [The
applicant] failed to comprehend the reason for tower’s request to enter at mid-field. He then failed
to communicate to the aircrew his intent or level of understanding of the current situation. The
situation was resolved safely and with adequate safety margins but required [my] intervention.
Extensive post flight debrief discussed this and other less glaring CRM breakdowns. Bottom line:
AC must never lose SA [situational awareness] or immediately take steps to regain it. … Stick and
rudder skills were at required levels. CRM was not at AC levels (see specific task comments).
EP/systems/procedural knowledge generally good with some exceptions.
• A letter dated November 25, 2003, indicating that the applicant had completed the
requirements in the Air Operations Manual for the HH-60J Proficiency Course on October
31, 2003; for Rotary Wing Instrument Check on October 29, 2003; and for CRM Refresher
on October 29, 2003.
SUMMARY OF THE APPLICANT’S RECORD
On August 12, 1999, the applicant was appointed a lieutenant junior grade in the Coast
Guard Reserve. He had previously served on active duty in the Army for almost ten years, during
which he trained as a helicopter pilot, accumulated more than 1000 flight hours, advanced to the
Army equivalent of an Aircraft Commander, and was promoted to the rank of captain (O-3).
Based on his experience, the applicant was assigned to a Coast Guard air station as a helicopter
(HH-60J) copilot and began serving on an extended active duty.
On the applicant’s first OER as a helicopter copilot, for the period August 12, 1999,
through July 31, 2000, he received all marks of 4 in the performance categories, including “Pro-
fessional Competence,” and the comparison scale, except for one mark of 5 for “Speaking and
Listening” and one low mark of 3 for “Responsibility,” due to “not arriving at the appointed
place of duty on time.” The written comments about his performance include the following:
• “Notable aviation/[public affairs officer] skills & knowledge. Flew 163.2 H60 mishap-
free flight hours, 53 sorties, 7 SAR cases.”
• “Supervisor’s marks reflect the best performance of the period, not the overall perform-
ance.”
• “Showed progress as copilot: aggressively pursued, obtained NVG Level II qualification;
qualified as ODO.”
• “[The applicant] has the potential and the skills to be a successful officer and aviator.
Minimum performance standards were not met during the first few months assigned at this
unit. Had a slow start meeting expectations even after numerous counseling sessions. Pos-
sesses good flight skills and operational awareness, performance while on deployment lauded
by deployed H-60 Aircraft Commander. Coming on speed as a Coast Guard Officer, present-
ly performing at the LTJG level. I expect that based on observed performance towards the
end of this reporting period [he] will become a fully productive and reliable member of Team
Coast Guard.”
On the applicant’s second OER as a helicopter copilot, for the period August 1, 2000, to
January 31, 2001, which was prepared by a new Supervisor and Reporting Officer, he received
mostly marks of 4 in the performance categories, including “Professional Competence,” five
marks of 5, and a mark in the fourth spot on the comparison scale. The supporting comments
include the following:
• “Solid aviation skills. Flew 180+ hours including 21 SAR cases resulting in 2 lives
saved. … played integral role in fugitive hunt after smugglers abandoned vsl … ”
• “[C]ontinued to solidify and expand reputation as a trusted and operationally effective
pilot.”
• “Sound judgment in cockpit decision making; while engaged in International SAR/LE;
evaluated risks associated with rough area landings, reduced exposure, completed mission
and maintained safety of aircraft & crew. Deployed Aircraft Commanders praised thorough-
ness and initiative shown coordinating missions with OPBAT controllers geographically
remove from deployed site. Astute attention to detail on preflight inspection identified incor-
rect installation of engine cowling; prevented potential aircraft damage/inflight emergency.”
• “Progressing steadily as an aviator; showed strong interest/ability in growing pilot role
beyond already considerable stick and rudder skills to broader mission mgmt issues; will be
ready for First Pilot upgrade soon. I saw purposeful improvement in approach & attentive-
ness to duties throughout the period; began by waiting to be told what to do & tending to let
deadlines slip, ended with more diligent responsiveness & several notable examples of
leadership initiative. … I expect continued aviation/admin challenges will be easily met; clear
potential to succeed as O3 [lieutenant].”
On the applicant’s third OER as a helicopter copilot, for the period February 1 through
June 30, 2001, he received five marks of 4 and thirteen marks of 5 in the performance categories,
as well as a mark of 5 for “Professional Competence” and a mark in the fifth spot on the com-
parison scale. The supporting comments include the following:
• “Notable aviation skills. Flew 62 sorties totaling over 180 mishap-free flight hours.
Efforts crucial to successful completion of 12 SAR cases resulting in 2 lives saved … Com-
pleted NVG upgrade flight syllabus; raised own qualifications to highest level for night aided
operations.”
• “Steadily progressing aviator abilities demo’d on several notable SAR/LE cases.”
• “[The applicant] showed strong determination to exceed expectations & actively expand
knowledge/quals in prep for increased responsibility. Balanced approach to aviation & col-
lateral duties ensured robust professional growth in both arenas. Info Tech continues as an
area of high personal interest/ability offering opportunity for specialization. … Progressing
nicely as an aviator with obvious motivation and talent. I strongly recommend promotion to
O3.”
On the applicant’s fourth OER as a helicopter copilot, for the period July 1, 2001, through
January 31, 2002, he received ten marks of 4 in the performance categories, including “Profes-
sional Competence,” eight marks of 5, and a mark in the fourth spot on the comparison scale.
The supporting comments include the following:
• “Flew over 140 flight hrs on a wide variety of missions including 6 SAR cases resulting
in 2 lives saved. … Played integral role in complex pursuit of smuggling suspect engaged by
multiple government agencies. Provided vital backup to Acft Cmdr; rapidly located safe
landing site when suspects grounded vessel … Vigilant situational awareness during night
boat hoist trng averted likely mishap; observed Acft Cmdr’s unintentional descent, assertively
took control of acft to prevent collision with vessel.”
• “Airmanship & positive interaction with aircrews contributed to ops success. Comfort-
able and earned my full trust in copilot role but evidence of efforts to show skill/knowledge
for FP [first pilot] upgrade was limited.”
• “Notable initiative in operational aspects of duties; stepped up readily for missions &
deployments. Evaluated risks intuitively as ODO and copilot, applied ‘assertiveness with
respect’ in recommending courses of action, keeping superiors informed, and even coming on
flight controls autonomously when needed to ensure safety when acft cmdr experienced ver-
tigo during night hoist.”
• “[The applicant] is a capable pilot and officer with clear potential. Solid performance in
operational flying & OPCEN watches … Effort in expanding horizons in aviation & collat-
eral duty knowledge/professionalism appeared to plateau and retrograde toward minimum
required this period. Has intellect/skills to upgrade to FP and shoulder more responsibility if
matched in kind w/ more robust motivation displayed previously. … Fully capable to succeed
as O3
On the applicant’s fifth OER as a helicopter copilot, for the period February 1 through
July 31, 2002, which was prepared by a new Supervisor and Reporting Officer, he received
twelve marks of 4 in the performance categories, including “Professional Competence,” six
marks of 5, and a mark in the fourth spot on the comparison scale. The supporting comments
included the following:
• “Solid performing aviator & officer. Flew 130 hours, including 16 on SAR & 45 on LE
resulting in 4 lives saved. Excellent performance on Stan check & exam: check pilot praised
that ‘airwork far exceeded copilot level,’ scored 96% on written exam; selected for entry into
First Pilot syllabus. Superbly planned night medevac 250 nm offshore …”
• “Steady, concerned team member readily deployed on short notice to allow fellow pilot to
attend to medical emer at home … Obtained CG mentoring training to expand leadership
skills; put knowledge to immediate use.”
• “[The applicant] is progressing as a copilot. Performed well on recent standardization
check/exam & now in First Pilot syllabus.”
• “Possesses capable aviation and leadership skill, and ability to accomplish assigned tasks.
… Clearly has the potential to provide bigger and better results as a pilot and carrying out
collateral duties yet motivation is lacking to employ considerable intellect and interpersonal
skills. When directly tasked and challenged shows the sparkle and organizational skills
needed to get things done. I believe is fully capable of succeeding as an O-3 but high per-
formance without close supervision must be forthcoming. Recommended for promotion with
peers.”
The applicant was integrated into the regular Coast Guard on May 25, 2002, and pro-
moted to lieutenant on August 14, 2002. On his first OER as a helicopter First Pilot, for the
period August 1, 2002, through May 31, 2003, the applicant received ten marks of 4 in the per-
formance categories, including “Professional Competence,” eight marks of 5, and a mark in the
fourth spot on the comparison scale. The supporting comments include the following:
• “Employed resource maturely, prosecuted SAR/LE cases as pilot & ODO w/ admirable
results … Flew 270+ hrs, deployed 49 days, 10 SAR cases & 45 LE missions- saved 5 …
professional aviation skills growing steadily, first pilot upgrade was well deserved, mature
expertise in medevac of child from a ship’s confined hoist area w/ inop acft stabilization
equip.”
• “Displayed leadership skills & concern for others; readily accepted duties on holidays &
weekends; filled short notice flights. … Sought add’l OCONUS deployments. … Postively
controlled H-60 operational/training flights; directed crews through all evolutions – openly
accepted feedback & adjusted mission profile as appropriate. … Led by example—arrived in
maintenance control one hour prior to flights to review aircraft & logs & brief crews for
flts/missions.”
• “[The applicant] completed a number of important tasks this rating period, including
upgrading to First Pilot. … Showed improvement in the ability to accomplish assigned tasks
without supervision.”
• “Clearly has the skills and judgment to assume greater leadership roles, assume larger
responsibilities and upgrade to Aircraft Commander as demonstrated with the improvements
made … the successful upgrade to First Pilot qualification. Possesses the intellect and mili-
tary bearing to be excellent example for fellow officers and enlisted as professional self-
discipline, motivation and dedication to Coast Guard increase with maturity. … Recommend-
ed for promotion with peers.”
• “Supervisor’s marks reflect the best performance of the period, not the overall perform-
ance.”
On August 28, 2003, the applicant’s commanding officer (CO) sent him a letter stating
the following:
1. On 24 July 2003, the unit Flight Examining Board has determined that your motivation is not at
the level to support a recommendation for entry into the aircraft commander syllabus. Although
you submitted a Request for Pilot Upgrade memorandum on 20 May 2003, you have not com-
pleted the closed book exam and emergency procedures review, both [of which] are required prior
to entering the syllabus flight phase. In addition, you have not completed the SAR fundamentals
course, which is required for an aircraft commander designation.
2. As required in [the Personnel Manual], when an aviator’s performance is considered substan-
dard, you are hereby directed to compete a training program to improve performance. That train-
ing program developed to improve your skills will consist of completing the
a. HH-60 Aircraft Commander Closed Book Exam
b. HH-60 Emergency Procedures Review
c. National Search and Rescue Fundamental Course
d. Preparatory training syllabus enclosed
3. The syllabus is to begin immediately and must be completed by 01 November 2003. This syl-
labus contains all preparatory requirements of [the Air Operations Manual] as well as a syllabus of
13 flights designed to offer you the opportunity to develop skill necessary to succeed as an H60
aircraft commander. Each flight in the syllabus will be flown with a flight examiner. Upon timely
completion of all items contained in the syllabus, the Flight Examining Board will review your
package for aircraft commander and make a recommendation to me regarding your potential to
upgrade.
4. In the event you are not successful in upgrading to aircraft commander prior to 31 January
2004, I will request that a Coast Guard Aviation Evaluation Board be convened to determine con-
tinued aviation suitability.
On December 11, 2003, the applicant’s CO informed him that his flight status would be
reviewed by an Aviator Evaluation Board (AEB) “due to a demonstrated lack of motivation to
progress to Aircraft Commander, recurrent loss of situational awareness during flight operations
and demonstrated poor leadership practices relating to flight situations.” The applicant acknowl-
edged the notice, acknowledged having reviewed the AEB regulations, and indicated that he did
not want to consult legal counsel.
On February 24, 2004, the Coast Guard Personnel Command (CGPC) convened the AEB,
which recommended termination of the applicant’s flight status. CGPC approved the recom-
mendation and terminated his flight status. Therefore, his collateral duty of Assistant IRM
Department Head became his primary duty until he was transferred in June 2004.
The applicant’s second OER as a First Pilot, for the period June 1, 2003, through June 7,
2004, is the disputed OER in this case. It was prepared by a new rating chain at the Air Station.
Aside from the mark of 3 he received for “Professional Competence,” the applicant received ten
marks of 4, six marks of 5, and one mark of 6 in the performance categories and a mark in the
fourth spot on the comparison scale. The comments concerning his aviation skills in the disputed
OER are the following:
Capably flew as [First Pilot] during training exercise with FBI; vertical delivery (VDEL) evolution
simulated response to major maritime incident in Greater Tampa Bay area; improve inter-
operability with counter terrorism agencies. Amassed 140 flt hrs including 12 maintenance test
flights; contributed to successful execution of 8 [search and rescue] cases; assisted 5 & saved 2
lives. Displayed lack of motivation & leadership to upgrade to Aircraft Cdr, well beyond the nor-
mally expected timeline of peers; aviation status terminated, reassigned to duties not involving
flight ops.
applicant’s flight status and stated the following regarding his potential as an officer:
The applicant’s Reporting Officer made no direct comments about the termination of the
[The applicant] has the operational knowledge, experience & intellect to succeed in the Coast
Guard. Rendered solid performance as Asst. IRM Officer; capably stood in as Department Head
during Supervisor’s absences and retirement. [He] facilitated the transition of the IRM Dept to a
streamlined division. I have high expectations that the change in venue to the Lant Area/D5 Acc
branch will offer ample opportunities for [him] to demonstrate leadership capacity for increased
responsibilities outside the aviation environment. [The applicant] would be a good candidate for
IT or HLS postgraduate opportunities with marked improvements in leadership and initiative.
VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD
On August 28, 2007, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Coast Guard recom-
mended that the Board deny relief in this case.
The JAG stated that the applicant’s submissions “may indicate comprehension of the
given subject matter, [but] they do not encapsulate the totality of circumstances surrounding
those test scores; nor do they show the existence of a clear and prejudicial violation of statute,
regulation, or misstatements of significant facts” in the disputed OER regarding his professional
competence. The JAG argued that the applicant’s evidence was insufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption of regularity with respect to his rating chain’s preparation of the OER, and noted that
some statements in his evidence supports the comments made in the rating officials’ declarations
(see below). The JAG alleged that the disputed OER, including the mark of 3, “was properly
prepared in accordance with the Personnel Manual; that it represents the honest professional
judgment of his command; and that it accurately reflects [his] actual professional competence
during the period of the report.”
The JAG adopted the findings and analysis of the case provided in a memorandum pre-
pared by CGPC, which the JAG forwarded as the Coast Guard’s advisory opinion. CGPC stated
that the applicant’s allegation about the mark of 3 for “Professional Competence” being errone-
ous and unjust “is without merit.” CGPC stated that the copilot critiques and task proficiency
reports submitted by the applicant are refuted by the declarations of his Supervisor and Report-
ing Officer, which are summarized below. CGPC alleged that the written comment adequately
supports the mark of 3, as required by the Personnel Manual, and the applicant has “not provided
evidence that overcomes the presumption of regularity” afforded the disputed OER.
Declaration of the Applicant’s Supervisor
The commander who supervised the applicant as head of the IRM Department, stated that
since three years have passed and he has retired from the Coast Guard, he has only general rec-
ollections of the issues involved in the application. The Supervisor stated that he did not person-
ally fly with the applicant but was informed
by the Operations Department that [the applicant] was faltering in his progression to Aircraft Com-
mander. To furnish impetus for [him], the Operations Officer provided a reasonable timeline with
syllabus benchmarks to attain that would put him back on track to upgrade to Aircraft Commander.
It was my understanding that special dispensations were made to accommodate the “eleventh hour”
completion of this syllabus. This individually tailored program to kick-start [his] progression is
atypical and speaks both to the Command’s willingness to go the extra mile and unfortunately, [the
applicant’s] paucity of initiative. These difficulties culminated in the convening of an Aviator’s
Evaluation Board (December 2003, I believe) to determine [his] suitability for continuance as a
Coast Guard pilot. I was not privy to the results; however, the mere fact that the Board was
assembled bespeaks to substandard performance as an aviator.
I do not agree with [the applicant’s] premise that his progression through the upgrade syllabus was
chronologically normal. According to the Air Operations Manual, among the criterion for the heli-
copter Aircraft Commander Designation is to have not less than 700 hours of total pilot time in
military aircraft, of which at least 150 hours is in rotary wing. [The applicant] joined the Coast
Guard in the fall of 1999 with well over 1,000 hours of total pilot time in the U.S. Army, most of
which was flying a helicopter which is very similar, if not identical, to the Coast Guard Jayhawk.
He alludes to an 18 month time period to upgrade from First Pilot to Aircraft Commander. I’m
unsure where he obtained this figure because it’s not in the Air Ops Manual. The Coast Guard’s
expectation is that even the lowest common denominator, a fledgling aviator with no previous mili-
tary experience (i.e., nugget), should be able to ascend to the Aircraft Commander designation well
within the completion of his or her first tour of duty. As a rule, the majority of Direct Commission
Aviators upgrade in considerably less time because of their flight hours accumulated and expertise
gained in another military service. [The applicant] benefiting from previous H-60 experience and
unconstrained by the need to build flight hours prior to entering the upgrade syllabi, was unable or
disinclined to successfully achieve Aircraft Commander despite being at Air Station Xxxxxxxx for
over 4 years.
Declaration of the Applicant’s Reporting Officer
The Deputy Executive Officer of the air station, who served as the applicant’s Reporting
Officer, stated that the applicant earned the mark of 3 for “Professional Competence” because his
competence to become a safe and effective Aircraft Commander was in question and he “did not
take full advantage of training opportunities afforded to him during the period.” The Reporting
Officer further stated that the command asked CGPC to convene an Aviator Evaluation Board
(AEB) for the applicant on December 11, 2003, to assess his performance, potential, and motiva-
tion for aviation service. He explained that the applicant
was designated a Copilot in the HH-60J aircraft on 29 October 1999 and First Pilot on 4 December
2002. The command disapproved [his] 20 May 2003 request to upgrade to Aircraft Commander
based on the Air Station Xxxxxxxx Flight Examining Board’s (FEB) recommendation. [He] did
not have the prerequisites completed, such as the National Search and Rescue Fundamentals
Course required by the CG Air Operations Manual and the Emergency Procedure Review and
Closed Book Exam required by Air Station Xxxxxxxx Organizational Manual. The FEB members
also advised the command that they lacked confidence in [his] ability to provide the necessary
leadership required as an Aircraft Commander.
On 28 August 03, in an effort to provide [the applicant] an opportunity to gain the FEB’s confi-
dence, the command directed that [he] be entered in an Aircraft Commander preparatory training
syllabus. The syllabus and all remaining prerequisites required by the CG Personnel Manual and
the Air Operations Manual were to be completed prior to 1 November 2003. However, [he] did
not take the National Search and Rescue Fundamentals Course exam until 1 November 2003 and
did not receive positive results from the exam until 4 November 2003. More importantly, five of
thirteen flights in the training syllabus remained incomplete as of the 1 November 2003 deadline.
[The applicant] did complete the syllabus on 14 November 2003, two weeks beyond the deadline.
The preparatory training plan afforded [the applicant] the opportunity to demonstrate his willing-
ness and desire to assume the role as an Aircraft Commander. Areas during the preparatory train-
ing identified as points of concern were situational awareness, motivation, and leadership. There
were several occurrences when situational awareness and communication breakdowns occurred
that required safety pilot intervention to maintain compliance with Air Traffic Control instructions
and to ensure the safety of the crew. During these situations, [the applicant] did not exercise the
authority and leadership he was given during preflight briefs to manage the flight as if he was the
Aircraft Commander.
[The applicant’s] behavior was inconsistent with that of an aspiring Aircraft Commander, especial-
ly when considering that he had over 1,250 flight hours of experience in the HH-60J helicopter and
a total of over 2,250 military flight hours. [He] demonstrated a lack of motivation to develop as an
aviator and a lack of desire to accept additional responsibility and leadership in the aircraft during
the reporting period.
APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE COAST GUARD’S VIEWS
On October 12, 2007, the Chair received the applicant’s response to the views of the
Coast Guard. Regarding his Supervisor’s claim that he was given a reasonable amount of time to
complete the syllabus, the applicant alleged that he had only “two months to complete flights that
normally take six months,” and that during those two months he had a two-week deployment in
the Bahamas, one week of annual training at an Aviation Training Center, and one week assigned
to Maintenance Test Pilot duties. Therefore, he had to complete the fifteen flights required by
the syllabus in just the remaining month of time, and he worked very hard to do so. For example,
on November 4, 2003, he “performed 3 hours’ worth of aircraft maintenance ground runs and a
short test flight in order to get a flyable aircraft for syllabus training. After the maintenance flight
I quickly completed an Instrument flight plan and flew the syllabus RT-6 Airways training flight
… . Due to a high maintenance spike there was a shortage of aircraft available for training dur-
ing this period. Because of this the flying portion of the syllabus was not completed until 14
November 2003.”
The applicant also challenged the Supervisor’s claim that the syllabus was specially tai-
lored for him. He stated that it comprised the same eleven recurrent training flights that all
aviators must complete every six months and nothing special was added to enhance his training.
His instructors “were told to get the flights done as soon as possible.” The applicant further
alleged that two other helicopter pilots at the station who received Aircraft Commander training
plans “were given five tailored scenario flights to determine their readiness level.”
The applicant claimed that he completed all of the written prerequisites on time since he
passed the HH-60 Aircraft Commander Closed Book Exam on September 16, 2003; the HH-60
Emergency Procedure Review on October 31, 2003, as part of his annual training; and the
National Search and Rescue Fundamentals Course on November 1, 2003, although the grade was
posted on November 3, 2003. He submitted copies of his pilot flight log for November 2003; his
instructors’ critiques; his examination results; the letter dated November 25, 2003, about his
completion of three courses;
The applicant challenged his “command’s concern that I have an uncorrectable situational
awareness and communications problem.” He alleged that such a problem would have mani-
fested itself during all of his flights and would have been addressed in all of the training records.
He further alleged that “[a]ll aviators make mistakes while flying training and real world mis-
sions. The small mistakes I made on my training flights were typical and reviewed after each
flight. My mistakes were not an indication of an uncorrectable trend.”
The applicant argued that because his Supervisor cannot remember all the marks and
comments he included in the OER, it is possible that he assigned the applicant a mark of 5 for
“Professional Competence” and that the command changed it without authorization or opportu-
nity to observe the applicant’s performance. The applicant stated that he “invested many hours
studying and practicing aircraft limitations, emergency procedures and numerous aviation-
specific tasks to attain/maintain proficiency in all aspects of Coast Guard aviation.” He argued
that his dedication is proven by his test scores and flight critiques. He further argued that the
declarations of his Supervisor and Reporting Officer “provided feedback that is relative to ques-
tioning my motivation, but is not appropriate for determining my professional competence.”
and was not given a chance to submit a reply to it.
Finally, the applicant argued that he was not counseled about the low marks on his OER
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
• Be recommended for the FP designation by the unit Operations Officer …
• Fulfill, to a more advanced degree, all requirements for [copilot] designation.
• Have not less than 500 hours of total pilot time in military aircraft.
• Complete an appropriate flight syllabus including a check flight.
• Complete a written closed book examination on critical aircraft systems, emergency procedures,
and limitations.
• Complete a written open book examination on:
o Aircraft systems and emergency procedures
o All applicable SAR and law enforcement directives and publications, pertinent Coast
o Weight and balance
o Fuel management
Guard manuals, and Commandant Instructions
Under Chapter 8.C.5. of the Air Operations Manual, to be designated a First Pilot (FP), a
helicopter copilot must
o Ground security of aircraft away from home unit
Under Chapter 8.C.6. of the Air Operations Manual, to be designated an Aircraft Com-
mander (AC), a helicopter First Pilot must
• Be recommended for the AC designation by the unit Operations Officer.
• Fulfill to a more advanced degree all requirements for FP.
• Complete Incident Command System (ICS-200) training in accordance with the Coast Guard Inci-
dent Command Implementation Plan, COMDTINST M3120.15 (series).
• For rotary wing (R/W) aircraft, have not less than 700 total pilot hours in military aircraft (exclud-
ing 3rd pilot time), of which at least 150 hours is in R/W aircraft.
• Complete a formal National Search and Rescue residence or correspondence course. The Search
and Rescue Fundamentals Correspondence Course (Short Title: SARFND) was designed to fulfill
this requirement.
• Complete an appropriate flight syllabus including a check flight.
• Complete a closed book examination on critical aircraft systems, emergency procedures, and
limitations.
• Complete an open book exam on:
o Air Operations Manual, COMDTINST 3710.1 (series)
o U.S. Coast Guard addendum to the United States National Search and Rescue
Supplement (NSS) to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
Manual (IAMSAR), COMDTINST M16130.2 (series)
o Current directives, including unit, district, and Commandant Instructions
o Pertinent technical data and publications concerning aircraft operations
o Application of operations and communications plans
• Complete an oral exam that focuses on the practical application of the material examined via the
open and closed book exams. Special emphasis will be placed on evaluating the candidate’s judg-
ment and maturity during this exam.
• Demonstrate, to a high degree, ability to:
Resource Management principles
o Exercise flight discipline and aircrew supervision, including the use of Crew
o Carry out all types of SAR missions including duty as on-scene commander, as
o Carry out all other types of missions normally performed by the unit (i.e., Drug or
appropriate for type
Fisheries LE, SAR, MEP, ATON, etc.)
Under Article 6.A.1.h. of the Personnel Manual, CGPC convenes an Aviator Evaluation
Board (AEB) “when necessary to evaluate the performance, potential, and motivation for con-
tinued service in flight status of certain Coast Guard aviators. The Board will function in an
advisory capacity to the convening authority and will recommend appropriate action to perform
the duties required.” Article 6.A.1.h.1. states that CGPC will normally convene an AEB within
30 days of advisement by the commanding officer that any of the following conditions are
thought to exist:
a. The aviator has demonstrated faulty judgment in flight situations. This may be evidenced by
serious or repeated violations of flight discipline or mishaps involving pilot judgment.
b. The aviator has demonstrated a lack of general or specific flight skills. This may be evidenced
by mishaps or near mishaps involving pilot skill, failure to satisfactorily complete all or any part of
a prescribed training syllabus, or failure to comply with minimum annual flight requirements for
reasons within his/her control.
c. The aviator has demonstrated certain habits, traits of character, emotional tendencies, lack of
mental aptitude, or motivation that makes questionable his/her continuance in assigned flying
duties.
d. The aviator is considered to be professionally unfit for flying for any reason not specified above.
e. The aviator is considered by a military flight surgeon not to be aeronautically adaptable.
Article 6.A.1.h.2. states that in preparing for an AEB, the commanding officer must
gather any supporting documentation, such as informal investigations, Flight Examining Board
(FEB) minutes, notes to the file, evaluation reports, training records, etc.” It also states that
before reporting to CGPC, the CO must discuss the deficiencies with the aviator; fly with the
aviator if the CO is qualified on the type of aircraft flown by the aviator; ensure that several
members of the FEB evaluate the aviator’s performance in writing; direct a plan or program for
improvement with definite objectives if the aviator’s performance is substandard; and ensure that
the aviator’s “[e]valuation report comments and marks should coincide with those of the aviator's
training and/or syllabus records.”
Article 6.A.1.h.3. of the Personnel Manual states that the CO will send CGPC a summary
of the pertinent facts of the case, including the CO’s own evaluation of the aviator’s abilities;
statements of any witnesses; a copy of the written notification of the AEB to the aviator; the
aviator's flight logs, training records, and any pertinent correspondence, such as ATC Mobile
evaluation, minutes of Unit Standardization Board, etc.; a summary of the aviator’s total flight
hours, total hours for the previous three months, total hours by model for the previous three
months, and the types of aircraft which the aviator is currently qualified to fly; and a physical
evaluation by a military flight surgeon. This case file is provided to the AEB members in
advance.
Article 6.A.1.i. states that an aviator is not entitled to be represented by legal counsel
before an AEB since an AEB is an informal board, but CGPC may appoint legal counsel upon an
aviator’s request. Article 6.A.1.j. states that an AEB consists of one flight surgeon and three
Coast Guard aviators who are senior to the aviator under evaluation and who are “completely
familiar with the type of flight operations involved. No member shall be appointed who is con-
sidered to be a prospective witness or interested party.” Article 6.A.1.k.2. states that the AEB
shall have informal proceedings “to permit a free exchange of information and development of
additional relevant facts.” Article 6.A.1.k.3. states that both the AEB members and the evaluee
shall “be given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. It is also important that the Board
question the evaluee. The evaluee and a reasonable number of witnesses should appear in person
during Board proceedings.” Article 6.A.1.k.4. states that CGPC shall provide the senior member
of the AEB with sample opening comments and statements to make to witnesses. Article
6.A.1.k.1. states that after considering all of the available information, the AEB will make one or
more of the following recommendations:
a. Continuation in full flight status.
b. Probationary flight status for a definite period.
c. Additional training.
d. Orders to duty not involving flying.
e. In the case of a Reserve officer, retention on or release from active duty.
Article 6.A.1.l. states that the AEB will submit to Commander, CGPC, for review all
pertinent documents, as well as its finding and recommendations, including a minority report, if
any. Commander, CGPC, notifies the aviator by letter of his final decision about the aviator’s
flight status. Article 6.A.1.o. states that an aviator “whose flight status has been terminated as a
result of actions taken under paragraphs d., g., or h. will be reassigned to duty or released as
required by the needs of the Service at that time.”
Article 10.A.4.c.4. of the Personnel Manual provides the following instructions for Super-
visors completing their section of an OER (similar instructions are provided for Reporting Offi-
cers in Article 10.A.4.c.7.):
b. For each evaluation area, the Supervisor shall review the Reported-on Officer’s performance
and qualities observed and noted during the reporting period. Then, for each of the performance
dimensions, the Supervisor shall carefully read the standards and compare the Reported-on Offi-
cer’s performance to the level of performance described by the standards. The Supervisor shall
take care to compare the officer’s performance and qualities against the standards—not to other
officers and not to the same officer in a previous reporting period. After determining which block
best describes the Reported-on Officer’s performance and qualities during the marking period, the
Supervisor fills in the appropriate circle on the form in ink.
d. In the “comments” block following each evaluation area, the Supervisor shall include comments
citing specific aspects of the Reported-on Officer’s performance and behavior for each mark that
deviates from a four. The Supervisor shall draw on his or her observations, those of any secondary
Supervisors, and other information accumulated during the reporting period.
e. Comments should amplify and be consistent with the numerical evaluations. They should iden-
tify specific strengths and weaknesses in performance. Comments must be sufficiently specific to
paint a succinct picture of the officer’s performance and qualities which compares reasonably with
the picture defined by the standards marked on the performance dimensions in the evaluation area.
Mere repetition or paraphrasing of the standards is not sufficient narrative justification for below
or above standard marks.
g. A mark of four represents the expected standard of performance. Additional specific perform-
ance observations must be included when an officer has been assigned a mark of five or six to
show how they exceeded this high level of performance. Those assigned the superlative mark of
seven should have specific comments demonstrating how they exceeded the six standard block.
● ● ●
● ● ●
Article 10.A.4.c.8.a. states that on the comparison scale in an OER, a Reporting Officer
“shall fill in the circle that most closely reflects the Reporting Officer’s ranking of the Reported-
on Officer relative to all other officers of the same grade the Reporting Officer has known.”
Article 10.A.4.g. allows an officer to submit a written OER Reply within fourteen days of
receiving any OER in order to “express a view of performance which may differ from that of a
rating official.” The OER Reply must be “performance-oriented” and may not address interper-
sonal relations or include “a personal opinion of the abilities or qualities of a rating chain mem-
ber.” An OER Reply is forwarded to CGPC through the rating chain, whose endorsements may
include comments about the OER Reply.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Board makes the following findings and conclusions based on the applicant's military
record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and applicable law:
1.
2.
5.
The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552.
3.
The application was timely.2
Article 10.A.1.b.1. of the Personnel Manual provides that “[c]ommanding officers
must ensure accurate, fair, and objective evaluations are provided to all officers under their com-
mand.” The applicant alleged that the low mark of 3 he received for “Professional Competence”
on the disputed OER is erroneous and unfair because, contrary to his Supervisor’s written com-
ment, he did not display a lack of motivation or leadership to upgrade to Aircraft Commander
and he was not “well beyond the normally expected timeline of peers” for upgrading to Aircraft
Commander. To establish that an OER is erroneous or unjust, an applicant must prove that it
was adversely affected by (a) a “misstatement of significant hard fact,” (b) a “clear and prejudi-
cial violation of a statute or regulation,” or (c) factors that “had no business being in the rating
process.”3 The Board begins its analysis in every case by presuming that the disputed OER is
correct as it appears in the record, and the applicant bears the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it is erroneous or unjust.4 Absent evidence to the contrary, the Board
presumes that the applicant’s Supervisor and Reporting Officer prepared the disputed OER “cor-
rectly, lawfully, and in good faith.”5
The record indicates that the applicant failed to file an OER Reply to rebut the dis-
puted OER, as provided under Article 10.A.4.g. of the Personnel Manual. Although he com-
plained that no one told him about his right to file an OER Reply, he is charged with knowing the
OER regulations, which accord all officers the right to reply to any OER. Failure to file an OER
Reply does not waive an officer’s right to seek correction of the disputed OER but may be con-
sidered evidence that he considered the OER to be correct at the time he received it.
The applicant alleged that the criticism of his motivation in the disputed OER was
unfair because from the beginning of the evaluation period on June 1, 2003, until his flight status
was removed by the AEB, he diligently worked toward acquiring the Aircraft Commander desig-
nation. The applicant argued that his motivation should not have been criticized in the OER
because he did not become a First Pilot until December 4, 2002; because he submitted a request
form regarding his progression to Aircraft Commander on May 20, 2003; because he diligently
worked through the syllabus he was given and failed to meet the November 1, 2003, deadline
through no fault of his own; and because First Pilots normally take 18 months to progress to Air-
craft Commander.
The record shows that throughout the applicant’s five years at the air station, his
command frequently commented in his OERs about his motivation, or lack thereof, to progress
as an aviator. On his first OER as a copilot, his Reporting Officer noted that the applicant had
made “a slow start meeting expectations.” On his second OER as a copilot, his new Reporting
Officer noted that he was “progressing” and was expected to upgrade to First Pilot soon. How-
2 Detweiler v. Pena, 38 F.3d 591, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that section 205 of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil
Relief Act of 1940 “tolls the BCMR’s limitations period during a servicemember’s period of active duty”).
3 Germano v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1446, 1460 (1992); Hary v. United States, 618 F .2d 704 (Ct. Cl. 1980);
CGBCMR Dkt. No. 86-96.
4 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b).
5 Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl.
1979).
4.
6.
7.
ever, the applicant did not upgrade to First Pilot until almost two years later. On the applicant’s
third OER as a copilot, the Reporting Officer praised his “obvious motivation” but noted that he
was still “progressing.” On his fourth OER as a copilot, the Reporting Officer indicated that the
applicant’s apparent motivation to progress as an aviator had declined. On his fifth OER as a
copilot, the Reporting Officer wrote that the applicant’s “motivation is lacking.” After the appli-
cant upgraded to First Pilot, his Reporting Officer indicated on his next OER that the applicant
had the potential to upgrade to Aircraft Commander as his “self-discipline, motivation, and dedi-
cation to the Coast Guard increase with maturity,” although the applicant was already 38 years
old.
Such recurrent commentary—primarily negative—on the applicant’s motivation
to progress as an aviator by all of the officers who served as his Reporting Officers at the air sta-
tion from 1999 through 2004 indicates that the applicant’s career as an aviator, although “pro-
gressing,” was not, in fact, progressing at the expected rate and that his Reporting Officers deter-
mined that his slow progress resulted from a lack of motivation. However, under Articles
10.A.4.c.4.b. and 10.A.4.f.11. of the Personnel Manual, an OER may reflect only the officer’s
observed performance during the evaluation period. Therefore, the numerical mark of 3 and the
comment about the alleged “lack of motivation & leadership to upgrade to Aircraft Cdr, well
beyond the normally expected timeline of peers” in the disputed OER are required to reflect per-
formance that occurred after the start of the evaluation period on June 1, 2003, and cannot be
based on his alleged lack of motivation during prior evaluation periods.
The record shows that on July 24, 2003—almost eight weeks into the evaluation
period for the disputed OE—a Flight Examining Board convened at the air station and deter-
mined that the applicant lacked motivation to progress to Aircraft Commander. Although the
applicant had submitted a request form for the upgrade on May 20, 2003, he had done so without
completing the prerequisites. Therefore, although the applicant may have become motivated
after receiving his CO’s August 28, 2003, letter and tried to complete the syllabus and other
requirements by November 1, 2003, he has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the comment that he lacked motivation and leadership to upgrade during the reporting period is
either erroneous or unfair. In this regard, the Board notes that his command’s concerns about his
motivation and leadership stemmed not only from his rate of completion of the requirements but
also from his performance in the cockpit, and this concern is reflected in some of the flight cri-
tiques submitted by the applicant.
The applicant alleged that the OER comment that he displayed the alleged lack of
motivation and leadership “well beyond the normally expected timeline of peers” is unfair
because he had upgraded to First Pilot on December 4, 2002. However, the applicant’s “peers”
were officers who, like him, started serving as aviators for the Coast Guard in 1999. The appli-
cant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that during the reporting period for the
disputed OER he was not “well beyond the normally expected timeline of peers” for upgrading to
Aircraft Commander.
The accuracy of the mark of 3 and written comments in the disputed OER is
strongly supported in the declarations of the applicant’s Supervisor and Reporting Officer.
Moreover, in challenging the mark of 3 for “Professional Competence,” the applicant has ignored
the proverbial 800-pound gorilla in the living room: An Aviator Evaluation Board of senior
8.
9.
aviators convened during the evaluation period to assess the applicant’s performance, potential,
and motivation as an aviator, in accordance with Article 6.A.1.h. of the Personnel Manual, and
recommended the termination of his flight status, which CGPC then approved. While many
comments in the disputed OER show that the applicant was quite competent and motivated in
performing his collateral duties (which became his primary duties by default after his flight status
was terminated), the mark of 3 for “Professional Competence” is amply supported by the written
comments in the OER as required by Article 10.A.4.c.4. of the Personnel Manual. Although the
applicant argued that his level of motivation should be considered irrelevant to his professional
competence as an aviator, the written standards for the “Professional Competence” mark on an
OER form encompass the officer’s efforts to “grow professionally.”
Accordingly, the applicant’s request should be denied because he has not proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that the disputed OER was adversely affected by (a) a “mis-
statement of significant hard fact,” (b) a “clear and prejudicial violation of a statute or regula-
tion,” or (c) factors that “had no business being in the rating process.”6
10.
[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE]
6 See footnote 3 above.
The application of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction of his military
ORDER
record is denied.
Francis H. Esposito
Randall J. Kaplan
Darren S. Wall
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2007-120
2 Officers are evaluated by a “rating chain,” which normally includes a Supervisor, who is normally the person to whom the Reported-on Officer reports on a daily basis and who completes the first 13 numerical marks in an OER and their supporting comments; a Reporting Officer, who is normally the Supervisor’s Supervisor and who com- pletes the remaining marks and comments in an OER; and the Reviewer, who is normally the Reporting Officer’s The applicant stated that LT D gave her a mediocre...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2008-018
Most of the performance categories on the SOER are marked “not observed,” but the low marks of 2 for “Results/Effectiveness” and “Professional Competence” are supported by the following comments by the XO of the XXX squadron, who was the applicant’s Supervi- sor:5 Relieved of primary duty as a flight instructor pilot due to unsatisfactory performance in the Fixed- wing Instructor Training Unit (FITU) instructor training syllabus, a demonstrated lack of stan- dardization, and an attitude not...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 1998-020
This final decision, dated April 22, 1999, is signed by the three duly APPLICANT’S REQUEST FOR RELIEF The applicant, a xxxxxxxxxxx in the Coast Guard, asked the Board to correct his record by removing an officer evaluation report (OER) that contains comments referring to his knee surgery and convalescence. VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD On March 30, 1999, the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard recommended denial of the applicant’s request for relief. The provision for reply is intended to...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2009-034
This final decision, dated June 18, 2009, is approved and signed by the three duly APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS First Disputed Officer Evaluation Report (OER) The applicant asked the Board to correct his OER for the period May 1, 2005, to May 31, 2006 (first disputed OER) by raising his comparison scale mark in block 91 to show that he was marked as an “excellent performer; give toughest, most challenging leadership assignments” rather than as a “good performer; give tough challenging...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2005-053
This final decision, dated November 17, 2005, is signed by the three duly APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS The applicant asked the Board to remove from his record an officer evaluation report (OER) covering his performance during a short tour as the Operations Officer of the Xxxxxx, a high-endurance cutter, from May 1, 1998, to April 27, 1999. The applicant argued that the CO vio- lated the Personnel Manual when he delayed the OER by a year, failed to include a comment on the applicant’s...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 1999-142
He alleged that none of his supervisors or the executive officer (XO) of the Xxxx, who was his reporting officer and who wrote the comments, “had ever mentioned any watchstanding issues during the reporting period.” Upon receiving the disputed OER, the applicant alleged, he asked his supervisor about the negative comments. Naval Flight School and that his performance was “well above average.” However, as a student, his performance was not evaluated in his OERs but marked “not...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2006-104
On his OERs, his commanding officer strongly recommended him for promotion and noted the applicant’s desire to serve as the XO or CO of a cutter. On his first OER in this position, the applicant received all marks of 4 and 5 and his CO’s recommendation for promotion. On his OERs for this work, he has received high marks of 5, 6, and 7 in the performance categories, marks of 5 on the comparison scale, and his reporting officers’ strong recommendations for command afloat and promotion to commander.
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2007-121
Officer did not evaluate others during reporting period. In Block 10, the reporting officer did not recommend the applicant for promotion, operational assignments, or positions of increased responsibility, and instead wrote, “His leadership and professional skills are poor.” The reviewer authenticated the OER without comment. The reporting officer declared that the disputed OER was based on the applicant’s performance as measured against the OER standards expected of all Coast Guard...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2007-196
The reporting officer further stated: In block 7 of the OER, the reporting officer concurred with the supervisor’s marks and In the leadership section of the disputed OER, the applicant received a mark of 6 in “looking out for others,” marks of 5 in “developing others,” “directing others,” and “evaluations,” and marks of 3 in “workplace climate” and “teamwork.” The supervisors wrote the following in the comment block: [The applicant] was presented opportunities to learn critical new skills...
CG | BCMR | Advancement and Promotion | 2007-195
However, Sector Xxxxxxx’s published rating chain, which was issued on February 8, 2006, shows that the designated rating chain of the CO of the XXXX was the Chief of the Response Department as Supervisor; the Sector Commander (rather than the Deputy Sector Commander) as Reporting Officer; and the xxxxxx District Chief of Response (rather than the Sector Com- mander) as Reviewer. shall be sent to Commander (CGPC-opm). In addition, the delay of promotion notification dated May 2, 2007, cited...